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AMERICAN MUSLIMS: THE UNTOUCHABLES OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY? 
SOHAIL WAHEDI* 
ABSTRACT 
This article is about the future of Muslims in the American 
constitutional democracy. How this future will look like depends highly 
on how the dominant majority as well as those sitting in the political, 
executive and judicial branches of power will deal with the emergence 
of Islamophobia. This article explores the roots of American fear of 
Muslims and their faith and reflects on what Islamophobia and its 
reinforcement bring for the future of American democracy. This article 
contends that the American anxiety about Islam will create huge 
disparities and advance a political agenda tainted with animus toward 
Muslims. This insidious dis-invitation to Muslims to participate in the 
American democracy needs to be halted to cleanse the American 
political scene from anxiety, bigotry and exclusion.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
The surprising 2016 election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United 
States of America marked the beginning of a series of unprecedented steps, 
including both expressions as well as legal orders, which constituted a paradigmatic 
shift in the attitude of a major part of the political establishment toward 
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institutions, non-governmental organizations, citizens, and non-citizens.1 As such,  
members of the judiciary,2 political opponents,3 critical journalists,4 women,5 
members of minority groups in general, and American Muslims in particular,6 have 
been among those groups of people who have experienced serious confrontations 
with the President over the recent years.7 What these people have in common is 
that they either, to one or another extent, disagree with the politics of the current 
administration,8  or they have been considered, for whatever reason, a threat to 
the “Make America Great Again” project and pledge of President Trump.9  This brief, 
though alarming analysis helps us in two ways to put American constitutional 
democracy under critical scrutiny in an era of anxiety,10  enemy construction,11   
religious animus, and racial stereotyping.12   
First, it helps us to identify and categorize variations of troublemakers 
according to the current administration. Second, this finetuning helps us to explore 
why there are differences in the way in which the “winner,” i.e. the executive 
 
1.  Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 93 
IND. L.J. 177, 190 (2018) (theorizing what political norms in a constitutional democracy entail and 
illustrating how the President elect has violated these norms).  
2.  See generally Elizabeth Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge, 71 SMU L. REV. 249, 298 
(2018) (discussing how President Trump has scrutinized the legitimacy of judgments and developing an 
extensive argument for the judiciary to utilize social media against political attacks). 
3.  See generally Tiffany R. Murphy, Prosecuting the Executive, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 144, 160 
(2019) (on the need to cleanse the executive branch of power from [allegations of] corruption, in order 
to preserve the “tenets of democracy.”). 
4.  RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1301, 1309 (2017) (reconstructing and critical of the way in which the Trump administration has framed 
the media as enemy). 
5.  Lawrence J. Trautman, Grab ‘Em by the Emoluments: The Crumbling Ethical Foundation of 
Donald Trump’s Presidency, 17 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169, 198 (2018) (discussing the way in which women 
have been insulted by Donald Trump over the past few years). 
6.  See generally Sohail Wahedi, Muslims and the Myths in the Immigration Politics of the United 
Sates, 56 CAL. W.L. REV. 135 (2019) (showing how stereotyping of people with an immigrant background 
has resulted in tough policies singling out this group of people for disfavored treatment). 
7.  Yasmin Dawood, The Fragility of Constitutional Democracy, 77 MD. L. REV. 192, 198 (2017). 
8.  See Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1655 (2018) 
(illustrating how the Trump administration blames the “deep state” for its own political failures). 
9.  See Lindsay Pérez Huber, Make America Great Again: Donald Trump, Racist Nativism and the 
Virulent Adherence to White Supremacy Amid U.S. Demographic Change, 10 CHARLESTON L. REV. 215, 222 
(2016).  
10.  Khaled A. Beydoun, 9/11 and 11/9: The Law, Lives and Lies that Bind, 20 CUNY L. REV. 455, 
460 (2017) (on politics of exclusion based on fear). 
11.  See Stephen Behnke & Corey Artim, Stop the Presses: Donald Trump’s Attack on the Media, 
44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (2019); Bruce Brown & Selina MacLaren, Holding the Presidency Accountable: A 
Path Forward for Journalists and Lawyers, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 89 (2018) (critical of President Trump’s 
continuous attack on media); Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 
94 DENV. L. REV. 553 (2017) (on how the Supreme Court free speech jurisprudence could help to resist 
the attack on free media). 
12.  See Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to 
Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (2018); Khaled A. Beydoun, 
Muslim Bans and the (Re)Making of Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1740 (2017). 
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branch of power, deals with the “losers,”13  i.e. those who either disagree or have 
been considered unfit to “Make America Great Again.”14  This is a very helpful 
exercise to reflect more broadly on the near future of American democracy, 
focusing thereby on the question whether “losers,” all those who disagree or have 
been considered unfit, can equally take part in the process of decision-making.15   
This article contributes to this broad and challenging question by choosing one 
specific category of people, namely American Muslims, who need our serious 
attention.  
Admittedly, American Muslims do not form a homogenous group.16  But over 
the recent years, they have been considered a serious threat to the interests of the 
United States.17  And therefore, they have been singled out for restrictive measures 
in areas related to the protection of national security.18  This urges us to be seriously 
worried about unfair treatment of American Muslims.19  But this single argument is 
somehow not enough to diagnose the present context. We need something more 
to make a robust prognosis about the future of Muslims in the American 
constitutional democracy.20   
 
13.  See Peter Baker, Trump Hails Acquittal and Lashes Out at His ‘Evil’ and ‘Corrupt’ Opponents, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html 
(after the 2020 impeachment acquittal, President Trump called House Speaker Nancy Pelosi a “horrible 
person,” the cops involved in the process were “dirty,” and Senator Mitt Romney (Utah) who voted 
against the President in the impeachment trial was a “failed presidential candidate.”).  
14.  Cf. Maureen Johnson, Trickle-down Bullying and the Truly Great American Response: Can 
Responsible Rhetoric in Judicial Advocacy and Decision-Making Help Heal the Divisiveness of the Trump 
Presidency?, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 445, 463 (2017) (illustrating how Trump’s rhetoric and 
style could be used as a justificatory framework for racism and misogyny). 
15.  See Devon W. Carbado, States of Continuity or State of Exception: Race, Law and Politics in 
the Age of Trump, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3 (2019) (illustrating how the Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
reinforced disparities in different areas of law between the dominant majority and vulnerable minority 
groups, such as colored people); David Stebenne, Is American Democracy Endangered?, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 
919, 932 (2018) (proving the link between contemporary middle-class concerns in areas related to 
finance and politics to the waning influence of constitutional norms).  
16.  Ali A. Mazrui, Is There a Muslim-American Identity: Shared Consciousness Between Hope and 
Pain, 8 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 65, 67 (2003) (distinguishing four different types of identities for American 
Muslims related to: (i) geographical background; (ii) race; (iii) interests; (iv) citizenship). 
17.  Romtin Parvaresh, Prayer for Relief: Anti-Muslim Discrimination as Racial Discrimination, 87 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1313 (2014); Hilal Elver, Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to 
Islamophobia, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 138–74 (2012); Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, 
the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y.C. L. REV. 33, 42–43 (2009) 
(all criticizing policies that have effectively singled out Muslims for disfavored treatment because of their 
religious background). 
18.  See generally Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Internment: Special Registration and Other 
Human Rights Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, 29 VT. L. REV. 407, 422–28 (2005) (on 
post 9/11 security measures that have disfavored Arab and Muslim Americans). 
19.  See Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism 
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2850 (2001) (critical of security measures that have effectively 
singled out American Arabs for disfavored treatment because of their Arab background). 
20.  The medical terminology used in these two sentences comes from a conference I attended 
in summer 2019: Religious Persecution in the World Today: Diagnoses, Prognoses, Treatments, Cures 
(Aug. 2–3, 2019) (available at https://www.iclrs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/2019.Oxford.Persecution-Conference.Program-Final.pdf). 
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We need, on the one hand, some concrete information that helps us to 
identify categories of arguments that could justify our special attention for 
American Muslims. On the other hand, we need to contextualize the present 
findings in order to be able to say something meaningful about the future of 
Muslims in the American constitutional democracy. This approach of making first, 
an inventory of arguments and circumstances that urge us to be cautious, and, 
second, contextualizing the findings,21  is very fruitful in answering the question 
whether Muslims could be considered the untouchables of American democracy.22  
Those who do not belong to the American society.23  Whose representatives are 
fake.24  And for whom special legal instruments have been created and invoked as 
deterrents.25   
This article is about the future of Muslims in the American constitutional 
democracy. How this future will look depends highly on how the dominant majority 
as well as those sitting in the political, executive and judicial branches of power will 
deal with the emergence of Islamophobia. Therefore, Part II focuses on the 
presence of Islamophobia today. This Part defines Islamophobia as fear of Muslims 
and their faith, which ultimately results in deploying measures that single out 
Muslims qua Islam for disfavored treatment.26  Part III explores the roots of 
American fear of Muslims and their faith. Part IV reflects on what Islamophobia and 
its reinforcement bring for the future of American democracy. This Part argues that 
American anxiety about Islam leads to the political advancement of a dangerous 
“system of racial caste.”27  
II. ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE TRUMP ERA 
 The American anxiety about Islam,28  which is predominantly present in the 
margins of the Republican Party, and which has been fueled by President Trump 
over the past few years,29  has constituted the foundations of a wild conspiracy 
 
21.  Cf. Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Trump Travel Ban: Rhetoric vs Reality, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 491, 
522 (2019) (criticizing the inventory of arguments and circumstances approach). 
22.  This article uses the word “untouchable” in a metaphorical way.  
23.  See generally Jared A. Goldstein, Unfit for the Constitution: Nativism and the Constitution, 
from the Founding Fathers to Donald Trump, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 489, 552 (2018) (discussing anti-Muslim 
statements). 
24.  Rachel E. VanLandingham, Words We Fear: Burning Tweets & the Politics of Incitement, 85 
BROOK. L. REV. 37, 70 (2019) (criticizing Trump for urging congresswomen with an immigrant background 
to go back to their countries of origin to “fix” the problems over there). 
25.  Cf. Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 
135–36 (2018) (arguing that there is “obvious inconsistency” between recent Supreme Court decisions 
on religious animus: while the majority seems to show sympathy for religious neutrality in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), it seems to be quite insensitive 
toward that argument in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)). 
26.  See Sohail Wahedi, Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J. 213, 220 
(2019) (showing the analysis that resulted in this definition of Islamophobia showing how the insidious 
development of singling out Muslims qua Islam for disfavored treatment get institutionalized). 
27.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
28.  This article does not aim to make an empirical argument about the exact scope of 
Islamophobia.  
29.  Ryan M. Mardini, The “Muslim Ban” and the Constitutional Crisis, 96 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 
225, 230–31 (2019) (on mainstreaming racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and Christian nationalism by 
President Trump and his allies). 
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theory about Muslim presence in the United States.30  This theory combines three 
political and social perspectives in (i) framing Islam as a dangerous political 
ideology; (ii) presenting Muslims as a serious threat to national security; and (iii) 
urging authorities to undertake measures against the presence of both Islam as well 
as Muslims in the United States.31   
This theory is rejectionist in the sense that it denies considering Islam a 
religion, such as, for example, Christianity.32  It is also a constructionist theory 
geared toward enemy construction. It portrays Muslims as a real threat to national 
security and the American way of life.33  The anti-Muslim conspiracy theory is also 
interventionist. It requires authorities to stop the Muslim threat by a wide range of 
means, varying from travel bans to closure of houses of worship.34  This Part focuses 
on two matters. First, on the synergy between recent anti-Muslim political rhetoric 
and actual or propagated policies that single out Muslims for disfavored 
treatment.35  Second, on how this synergy accelerates the institutionalization of 
Islamophobia.  
A. Discourse of Islamophobia 
The increasing number of political attacks against Muslim presence in the 
United States,36  include three types of rhetorical attacks. Each of these attacks has 
a different subject matter. The targets have been religion, believers, and 
institutions. As such, Islam has been a delicate target for fierce attacks. The same is 
true for both groups of Muslims: civilians without any political function as well as 
Muslims in office. The third category that has been subjected to political aggression 
consists of Islamic institutions, such as, for example, mosques and other Islamic 
centers.37   
 
30.  MUSLIM ADVOCATES, RUNNING ON HATE: 2018 PRE-ELECTION REPORT 1 (2018) (arguing that on a 
long-term anti-Muslim bigotry will not help to win elections). 
31.  Id. at 6. 
32.  ASMA T. UDDIN, WHEN ISLAM IS NOT A RELIGION: INSIDE AMERICA’S FIGHT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 31–
65 (2019); Sohail Wahedi, Abstraction from the Religious Dimension, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 16 
(2017–2018). 
33.  Cyra Akila Choudhury, Shari’ah Law as National Security Threat?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 49, 81–82 
(2013) (stating how Islam has been constructed as a real threat to the interests of the United States). 
34.  MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 30, at 6 (mentioning prohibitions, tracking, surveilling and 
“even” eliminating Muslims as possible means in the fight against the Muslim threat). See also Marvin L. 
Astrada, Fear & Loathing in the Present Political Context: The Incubus of Securitizing Immigration, 32 
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 169, 200 (2018) (contextualizing such obvious anti-immigration means as 
“securitization” of immigration policies). 
35.  Beydoun, supra note 12, at 1755 (qualifying the relationship between the language and 
politics of Islamophobia as “synergistic” and “symbiotic,” whereby the political discourse of 
Islamophobia has been reinforced by state actions that consider Muslims a never-ending threat).  
36.  MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 30, at 6. 
37.  See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2018) (quoting some anti-
Muslim screens and criticizing the (absence of a sophisticated) legal approach to biases). 
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This political distrust of Islam, Muslims, and Islamic organizations has 
unambiguously been addressed by Donald Trump.38  He thinks that “Islam hates 
us,”39  and Koran “teaches some very negative vibe.”40  And, most probably, 
therefore, he has lashed out multiple times at Muslims and pledged, among others, 
for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”41  
Trump has justified this by arguing that “large segments” of Muslims hate 
Americans.42   
This alleged feeling of antipathy might clarify another contentious claim made 
by Trump: the celebration of 9/11 terrorist attacks by “thousands and thousands” 
of New Jersey Muslims.43  These people resemble, according to Donald Trump, “a 
great Trojan Horse” that puts the nation at a high risk of serious attacks.44  
Therefore, authorities need to be very “vigilant with respect to the Muslim 
population,”45  and implement, among others, a registry system that can monitor 
American Muslims.46  Because these people do not “assimilate [and] don’t want the 
laws that we have. They want sharia law.”47  To stop this and to reduce Islamic 
terrorism, Trump has said that he would “strongly consider” closing mosques, 
because “some of the ideas and some of the hatred—the absolute hatred—is 
coming from these areas.”48 
Trump’s alleged animus toward Islam,49  or, perhaps better said, his 
unconcern about unfair treatment of Muslims was reaffirmed during his 2020 visit 
to India. Dozens of Indian Muslims were attacked and killed by Hindu extremists,50  
 
38.  This Part does not provide a full overview of anti-Muslim statements. See also Jill E. Family, 
The Executive Power of Political Emergency: The Travel Ban, 87 UMKC L. REV. 611, 624 (2019); Stuart 
Chinn, Threats to Democratic Stability: Comparing the Elections of 2016 and 1860, 77 MD. L. REV. 291, 
293 (2017) (on how Donald Trump placed Islam and immigration at the center of campaigns). 
39.  Brian Klaas, Opinion, A Short History of President Trump’s Anti-Muslim Bigotry, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/15/short-history-president-
trumps-anti-muslim-bigotry/. 
40.  MUSLIM ADVOCATES, A RECORD OF BIGOTRY AND HATE: DONALD TRUMP’S LONG HISTORY OF ANTI-
MUSLIM ANIMUS 2 (2018), https://muslimadvocates.org/files/2018.06.12-Anti-Muslim-White-
Paper_DRAFT-Endnotes.pdf. 
41.  Gregory Krieg, Trump’s History of Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Hits Dangerous New Low, CNN (Nov. 
30, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/donald-trump-muslim-attacks/index.html. 
42.  Christine Wang, Trump Website Takes Down Muslim Ban Statement After Reporter Grills 
Spicer in Briefing, CNBC (May 8, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/trump-website-takes-down-
muslim-ban-statement-after-reporter-grills-spicer-in-briefing.html. 
43.  Klaas, supra note 39. 
44.  Joseph Tanfani, Donald Trump Warns that Syrian Refugees Represent ‘A Great Trojan Horse’ 
to the U.S., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-syrian-refugees-
debate-20161019-snap-story.html. 
45.  MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 40, at 10 n.10. 
46.  Id. at 2. 
47.  Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s 
Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-
timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.418b059fabaa. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Katie R. Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215, 230 (2019) (critically reconstructing 
Supreme Court’s non-consideration of the animus-argument in its travel ban judgment). 
50.  Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Delhi Rocked by Deadly Protests During Donald Trump’s India Visit, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/delhi-rocked-by-deadly-
protests-during-donald-trumps-india-visit.  
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yet Trump not only remained silent about the rise of anti-Muslim violence,51  he 
appreciated India’s approach to religious liberty.52  What message does this obvious 
ignorance, if not carelessness, about anti-Muslim bigotry, religious animus, and 
discrimination, send to American Muslims?53   
Something about Trump’s attitude suggests that he considers Muslims less 
protection-worthy than other groups.54 This message echoes strongly in the way 
Trump’s (ex-)political allies talk about Muslim presence in the United States.55 
For example, General Michael Flynn, a former national security advisor to 
President Trump, compared Islam to a “malignant cancer” that should not be 
considered a religion, but rather a dangerous and deadly political ideology.56 After 
all, as former Congressman, and current Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, once 
said: the political ambitions of Islam, and more specifically  
[the] efforts to expand the caliphate are not limited to the physical 
geography of the Middle East or other places where there are large 
Muslim majorities, and we should be concerned that every member of 
Congress understands that in the same way, such that we can do the 
things we need to do to keep us all safe.57 
This security argument that suggests Islam is a serious threat to the interests 
of the United States has been used to frame Muslim participation in the American 
constitutional democracy as dangerous, questionable and even sick.58 As such, 
Rashida Tlaib, one of the first ever elected Muslim Congresswomen, was considered 
 
51. Kevin Liptak, Trump Concludes India Visit Without Major Agreements, CNN (Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/24/politics/donald-trump-india-narendra-modi-trade/index.html. 
The anti-Muslim violence increased in the aftermath of the recently passed Citizenship (Amendment) 
Act 2019 that excludes Muslim immigrants from the right to become full citizens of India. See Anasuya 
Syam, Patchwork of Archaic Regulations and Policies in India: A Breeding Ground for Discrimination 
Practice Against Refugees, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1377, 1385 (2019). 
52.  Robert Mackey, Trump Praises Modi’s India, as Muslims Are Beaten on the Streets and a 
Mosque Is Defiled, INTERCEPT (Feb. 26, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/02/25/trump-praises-
modis-india-muslims-beaten-street-mosque-defiled/.  
53.  Cf. Johnson, supra note 14, at 463. 
54.  Cf. Andrew L. Whitehead, Samuel L. Perry & Joseph O. Baker, Make America Christian Again: 
Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election, 79 SOC. RELIGION 
147, 166 (2018) (concluding that Trump voters strongly support Christian nationalism that outcast 
Muslims and others who threaten Christian values of the United Sates); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Christian Legislative Prayers and Christian Nationalism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 453, 463 (2019) (on 
Trump’s endorsement of a Christian nationalist political language). 
55.  Mardini, supra note 29, at 230. 
56.  Matthew Rosenberg & Maggie Haberman, Michael Flynn, Anti-Islamist Ex-General, Offered 
Security Post, Trump Aide Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/us/politics/michael-flynn-national-security-adviser-donald-
trump.html.  
57.  Miranda Blue, GOP Rep Agrees With Frank Gaffney That Obama Has ‘Affinity’ For Terrorists, 
Muslim Congressman Could Be National Security Risk, RIGHT WING WATCH (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:55 PM), 
https://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/gop-rep-agrees-with-frank-gaffney-that-obama-has-affinity-for-
terrorists-muslim-congressman-could-be-national-security-risk/.  
58.  See generally MUSLIM ADVOCATES, supra note 30, at 13. 
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“a ‘danger’ who might ‘blow up’ the U.S. Capitol.”59 And Shahid Shafi, vice chairman 
of the Tarrant County Republican Party in Texas, was told that “not [all] 
Republicans . . . think Islam is safe or acceptable in the U.S., in Tarrant County, and 
in the [Republican Party].”60 But more generally, Muslims who want to be part of, 
and participate in the democratic process are called “schizophrenic,” because they 
believe in “two different philosophies” that compete with each other.61 Hence, 
plans to single out Muslim neighborhoods for extra security controls, “before they  
become radicalized,” have never been far away.62 The same is true for plans that 
have targeted places where Muslims come together, such as mosques.63 To put it 
in the words of Republican Senator and 2016 Presidential Candidate Marco Rubio: 
“[it’s] not about closing down mosques. It’s about closing down anyplace—whether 
it’s a cafe, a diner, an internet site—anyplace where radicals are being inspired.”64   
This brief overview of political statements about Muslim presence in the 
United States unveils how today’s political discourse has been dominated by strong 
anti-Muslim bigotry. And the bottom line of all this political shouting is that neither 
Islam, nor Muslims, nor any place related to Islam or run by Muslims, could be able 
to develop a bona fide relationship with the United States.65   
B. Politics of Islamophobia 
What does the anti-Muslim bigotry in the political discourse mean in terms of 
actual regulations and state policies?66 Apparently, it is not a very big deal anymore 
to advocate for measures that disfavor some people because of their religious 
beliefs.67 But can we, for example, say that there is a synergy between the bigoted 
political discourse and policies that affect civil rights of American Muslims?68 More 
 
59.  Holly Rosenkrantz, Florida Official Says U.S. Rep. Rashida Tlaib May “Blow Up” Capitol, CBS 
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-official-says-rep-rashida-tlaib-
may-blow-up-the-capitol/.  
60.  Adeel Hassan, Texas Republicans Rally Behind Muslim Official as Some Try to Oust Him Over 
Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019) (quoting Dorrie O’Brien who started a campaign to keep Shahid Shafi 
outside the Republican Party), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/us/muslim-republican-shahid-
shafi-texas.html. 
61.  Nick Gass, Carson: Muslims Who Embrace American Values Have to be ‘Schizophrenic,’ 
POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:50 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/ben-carson-muslims-
schizophrenic-219319.  
62.  George Zornick, Ted Cruz’s Radical New Proposal: Patrol and ‘Secure’ Muslim Neighborhoods, 
NATION (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ted-cruzs-radical-new-proposal-
patrol-and-secure-muslim-neighborhoods/.  
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importantly, can we identify policies that have effectively singled out Muslims for 
disfavored treatment because of their religion?69 
For the answer to these questions, we should not confuse the synergy critique 
with the large body of criticism of ethnic and racial profiling that over the last two 
decades have harassed people with an Islamic background or Muslim appearance 
in the fight against terrorism.70 We need to make a distinction between policies that 
have bolstered ethnic and racial profiling, and regulations “unconstitutionally 
tainted with animus toward Islam.”71 Hence, something like the infamous Muslim 
registry plan,72 the propagated closure of Mosques,73 or designing separate security 
mechanisms for areas dominated by Muslims,74 would come closer to the category 
of regulations we aim to conceptualize as measures that have singled out Muslims 
qua Islam for disfavored treatment.75 But we need to include one important 
disclaimer at this point. None of these measures have ever become law.76 Does this 
mean that we should renounce the synergy critique?77 Not really. Many of us still 
remember what happened, just a few days after Donald Trump took office in 2017. 
A “total and complete” chaos at major international airports inside and outside the 
United States.78 
The winner of the 2016 elections had issued Executive Order 13,769 that 
made it practically impossible for nationals of seven Muslim-majority countries to 
enter the United States.79 The main aim of this Executive Order was to keep 
troublemakers outside the country. It categorized them as people who “do not 
support the Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over 
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Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and 
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73.  Jonathan J. Kim & Eugene Temchenko, Constitutional Intolerance to Religious 
Gerrymandering, 18 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 28–29 (2018) (on the uselessness of such measures). 
74.  See generally Eliav Lieblich & Adam Shinar, The Case Against Police Militarization, 23 MICH. 
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American law.”80  Concrete examples of such people included honor-killers, 
women-abusers, and certain types of rigorists: either people responsible for “the 
persecution of those who practice religions different from their own) or those who 
would oppress Americans of any race, gender, or sexual orientation.”81 Drawing on 
such platitudes and stereotyping people because of their background left nothing 
to the imagination about the primary goal of this Executive Order: keeping as many 
Muslims as possible outside the country.82   
But the Trump administration faced difficulties in realizing this bigoted goal.83 
Both District as well as Circuit Courts granted (nationwide) injunctions, enjoining 
authorities from the full implementation of the Executive Order.84 These 
judgments, however, did not stop Trump from the remake of travel restrictions. He 
announced new policies “tailored to [the] very bad decision” of the Ninth Circuit 
that denied stay of the restraining order pending appeal.85  Soon after this 
announcement, the first and failed regime of travel restrictions was replaced by 
Executive Order 13,780,86 which was in many ways a remake of its predecessor.87 A 
remake that pursued the same bigoted goal, though not drawing on explicit anti-
Muslim stereotypes.88 But relying on a more neutral language did not save the 
administration from a new series of (nationwide) injunctions that once again 
blocked the full implementation of the travel restrictions.89 In doing so, Courts 
explicitly referred to the bigoted history of the restrictions and held, among others, 
that the enacted regulations were “issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular 
religion.”90   
Courts relied on similar grounds, namely serious concerns about anti-Muslim 
sentiments behind the travel restriction regimes, to block the implementation of 
Proclamation 9645, the successor of Executive Order 13,780.91 This successor was 
considered “a Muslim ban,”92  “unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward 
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84.  Injunctions were granted for different reasons. See Wahedi, supra note 6, at 154–61 (saying 
that absent the restrictions travelers would be allowed entry). 
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WL 462040, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting a nationwide TRO), aff’d, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 
2017) (denying a stay of the granted TRO). 
86.  Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
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692–94 (2018) (on the similarities and differences between the two Executive Orders, such as, for 
example, denying entry to nationals of six Muslim-majority countries and suspending the admission of 
refugees under the U.S. Refugee Admission Program). 
88.  Wahedi, supra note 6, at 162. 
89.  Id. at 164. 
90.  Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1134 (D. Haw. 2017) (granting nationwide TRO). 
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Islam.”93 This animus was “evidenced by official statements of the President . . . 
that graphically disparage the Islamic faith and its practitioners.”94 But despite such 
sharp condemnations of the travel bans by both Courts as well as legal scholars,95 a 
bitterly divided Supreme Court upheld Proclamation 9645.96  As such, the Court 
denied that the Proclamation reincarnated the promised and infamous Muslim 
travel ban.97 Furthermore, it reaffirmed what Trump’s advisors told him to do, to 
realize his bigoted goal of keeping as many Muslims as possible outside the country: 
replace Muslims with national security concerns. Hence, Trump v. Hawaii 
vindicated this substitution as “[p]erfectly legal, perfectly sensible.”98   
Trump’s series of travel bans are among the first ever measures developed 
that, given their bigoted history, fit within the category of, what we could call, 
politics of Islamophobia that disfavor Muslims.99 The enactment history of these 
measures provides important insights into how they fit the prevailing anti-Muslim 
conspiracy theory. As such, the travel bans are rejectionist in the sense that they 
substitute Islam with security concerns.100 The bans are constructionist as they 
contribute to enemy construction, portraying those who should not be admitted 
into the country as terrorists, rapists, gay bashers, honor killers, and so on.101 
Finally, the travel restrictions fit the last and interventionist prong of the anti-
Muslim conspiracy theory. The bans are necessary to save the nation from 
terrorism.102   
C. Reinforcement of Islamophobia 
The question arises of what Trump v. Hawaii means in terms of dealing with 
peculiar measures that are so obviously tainted with religious animus and bigotry. 
Does vindicating a travel ban tailored to meet bigoted election pledges advance a 
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xenophobic political agenda?103 And will this promotion reinforce and eventually 
institutionalize Islamophobia?104   
What is obvious is that Trump v. Hawaii did not water down the travel 
restriction regime of President Trump that has been imposed on nationals of 
predominantly Muslim-majority countries. On the contrary, and despite the 
presence of extensive critique on this judgment,105  the administration has relied on 
Trump v. Hawaii to add six new countries—two Asian and four African states—to 
the list of countries with limited or practically no access to the United States.106 This 
extension to countries like Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania which 
are home to large groups of Muslims suggests that Trump v. Hawaii has paved the 
way to a much more comprehensive Muslim travel ban.107   
The choice to add four African countries is a palpable indication of how Trump 
v. Hawaii has advanced a clearly xenophobic immigration agenda.108 The extension 
connects his outrageous statements about Africans to his broader anti-immigration 
political agenda.109 In a way, Trump v. Hawaii has helped the President to keep a 
larger number of people coming from, what he has called, “shithole countries,”110  
outside the United States either because he thinks that they “all have AIDS,”111  or, 
because he is afraid that they would never, ever “go back to their huts.”112 The 
advancement of this xenophobic and racist policy will create huge disparities 
between Americans, as it singles out very specific categories of people for 
disfavored treatment.113   
It may also create disparities because Trump v. Hawaii has set an important 
precedent for discriminatory state policies that disfavor groups of people under the 
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guise of disloyalty, national security protection, and immigration control.114 But in 
addition to this fear of a further institutionalization of Islamophobia, there is 
something more disturbing about this judgment that leads us to be pessimistic 
about the future of Muslims in the American constitutional democracy. It is the 
inconsistency in the legal appraisal of acts motivated by animus, by the Supreme 
Court.115   
As such, a few weeks before Trump v. Hawaii, there was Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,116 a case about denial of services to 
same-sex couples, religious animus, and state neutrality toward religion.117 In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority found, among others, that a state official who 
had said that religion has been used, historically, as “one of the most despicable 
pieces of rhetoric,” to disturb others, was a sign of “hostility . . . inconsistent with 
the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is 
neutral toward religion.”118   
But in Trump v. Hawaii, the majority held that the travel restrictions are 
justified for security reasons. Furthermore, the Court found that the text of the 
Proclamation “says nothing about religion [and the inclusion of five Muslim-
majority countries to the list of affected countries] . . . . does not support an 
inference of religious hostility.”119   
This asymmetrical approach in dealing with “pervasive official expressions of 
hostility,”120 has most probably been caused by an overprotection of majoritarian 
sensitivities about the American cultural-religious identity. And these sensitivities 
have been leading in answering the question “whether a government actor 
exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision that affects individuals’ 
fundamental religious freedom.”121 This asymmetry has a latent potential to 
reinforce Islamophobia in the near future. The overprotection of majoritarian 
sensitivities at the expense of other interests “erodes the foundational principles of 
religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has so emphatically protected, and it 
tells members of minority religions in our country” that they are not equally 
protection-worthy against religious bigotry and discrimination.122   
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III. ISLAMOPHOBIA AS THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE 
 How can we understand the outrageous statements against Muslims and 
their faith in the political discourse? And what is behind the rise in actual or 
propagated measures that single out Muslims qua Islam for disfavored treatment? 
Can we, for example, say that the inflammatory speeches against Muslims and 
other people with an immigrant background are indications that we have entered 
a completely new era? Can we, contemporaneously, contend that the rise in anti-
Muslim policies as well as propagated regulations creates “a new zone of 
lawlessness where [Muslims] are neither citizen nor alien, but rather . . . [adherents 
of the] inherently evil world called ‘Islam?’”123   
 What we can say, without hesitations, is that the “polemical tactics” used to 
present Muslims as outcasts who should be subjected to special laws are something 
new.124  But, more generally, religious intolerance, racial discrimination as well as 
politics of exclusion are something old.125  The history of migration to the United 
States contains many horrific examples of religious discrimination and racial 
exclusion. In the early days, some colonies were not open to, among others, 
Baptists, Jews, and Quakers.126 Others, such as, for example, members of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah’s Witnesses faced hatred 
and violence.127 And until very recently, Catholics suffered from hostilities and 
prejudices because of their beliefs.128  But for decades, many people, including 
those from Asia and the Middle East, both Christians as well as Muslims, had no 
chance to become citizens of the United States, because they lacked “whiteness.”129   
 This brief history informs us that the American political scene is not 
unfamiliar with religious bigotry, racism, and the exclusion of others.130  But this 
infamous history of prejudices and exclusion has repeated itself. The many 
references to Korematsu (on the  lawfulness of forced relocation of American 
Japanese), in the academic and political critiques on the travel bans of President 
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Trump, confirm, more or less, that politics of exclusion on the basis of race or 
religion, have never been eradicated, nor completely abandoned.131   
The same is true for plans that have singled out Islam qua Islam for disfavored 
treatment. Anti-Sharia legal initiatives across the United States are appropriate 
examples of such measures.132  These initiatives have been framed as something 
necessary in the “war for the survival of America.”133  More specifically, as means 
to protect certain Judeo-Christian values and to make sure “that our [C]ourts are 
not used to undermine those founding principles and turn [our country] into 
something that our founding fathers and our great-grandparents wouldn’t 
recognize.”134  Apparently, for those who defend such bigoted measures, the 
tension between Christian values and basic liberal principles, such as “democracy, 
equality, and tolerance is never in doubt, revealing sharply the degree to which 
[their] line of [reasoning] rests not on a thorough-going rationalist secularism, but 
[on] a political theology of Christian democracy in which the identity of democratic 
values with an imagined Christian civilizational tradition is unquestioned.”135 
What does this brief history tell us about the bigoted anti-Muslim political 
discourse and regulations based thereon? The fact that in the course of history 
many religious groups have suffered, to one or another extent, from religious 
bigotry suggest that today’s Islamophobia is the new victim of an old and ugly 
practice: religious intolerance.136  This animus feeds politics of exclusion that are 
deeply rooted in fear of the stranger and fear of losing control over peculiar 
interests.137 Historically, politics of fear and exclusion have affected migrant groups 
who did not share the majoritarian cultural-religious identity.138 In the past, 
Baptists, Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and Quakers were targeted.139 Today, politics 
of fear and exclusion affect American Muslims.140   
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IV. ISLAMOPHOBIA AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
How shall we appraise the comeback of bigotry and politics of exclusion? After 
all, and for a long time in history, Americans have presented their democracy and 
their efforts to provide equal access to all citizens in the democratic process as a 
big success story.141  Moreover, over the last decade, it was precisely this model 
that has been exported to other destinations,142  such as Afghanistan and Iraq.143   
But the American constitutional democracy, like many other Western democracies, 
faces some serious challenges that are, among others, related to immigration.144   
Today, security threats, caused by acts of terror all round the world and 
feelings of anxiety about a growing presence of cultures that do not belong to the 
dominant tradition of the society, put a high pressure on the executive and the 
regulatory branches of power to solve a continuous societal uneasiness about 
immigration with dispatch.145  Something similar has been expected from the 
judiciary, making this branch of power very vulnerable to fierce attacks,146  either 
by those who claim that the judiciary is simply advancing the authorities’ restrictive 
immigration agenda, closing its eyes to obvious discrimination and religious 
animus,147 or by those who claim that this branch of power is way too lenient 
toward the constitutional claims of migrants, neglecting pressing security needs.148 
Looking at some recent political developments related to immigration and 
people with an immigrant background or a colored appearance reveals that many 
racial stereotypes have been used to justify restrictions with far-reaching 
consequences upon civil rights. This exercise also unveils how minority groups, 
especially American Muslims, face serious challenges to participate in the American 
democracy. For example, their elected representatives at the local and federal level 
have repeatedly been accused of having double agendas that endanger the 
American society.149 Also, they have been regularly framed as unreliable people, 
aliens, and terrorists.150   
What message does this unfortunate development send to the adherents of 
the Islamic faith? Are they allowed to take part equally in the American 
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constitutional democracy, regardless of their religious background?  Although we 
may have no clear-cut answers to these important questions that arise in response 
to the widespread anti-Muslim bigotry,151 we nevertheless contend that relying on 
fact-free rhetoric, either to win elections or to justify certain regulations, is in fact 
a dis-invitation to American Muslims to participate as full-citizens in the American 
democracy. This insidious dis-invitation reincarnates a “system of racial caste,”152 
which downgrades American Muslims as second-class citizens,153  who, sooner or 
later, will become the “untouchables” of the American constitutional democracy. 
The outcasts of the society, whose claims for protection against bigotry, 
discrimination, and exclusion will be judged by other standards. Obviously, this 
development threatens, in an unprecedented way, the American Dream of a better 
life for everyone and everywhere in the country. This Dream might even become a 
nightmare because of a systematic deconstruction of what the American civil 
society has reached in terms of equal access to and protection of civil liberties.154  
Although we may not have very concrete suggestions to overcome the era of 
exclusion and religious animus, we nevertheless could call upon those sitting in the 
political and judicial branches of power to be aware of what the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom and neutrality toward religion entail and require. Even in 
anxious times.155   
V. CONCLUSION 
The American constitutional democracy is threatened by different actors and 
some un-American developments. As such, it is frankly perplexing to see how 
Muslims have been disfavored in areas so crucial to the functioning of the 
constitutional democracy. And what is even more regrettable is the restraint of the 
judiciary, or perhaps, the extreme extent of judicial deference toward presidential 
control over issues related to migration and border control that has made a proper 
protection of our most sacred freedoms practically impossible.156  The tragic 
synergy between inflammatory political rhetoric against American Muslims and the 
rise in anti-Muslim measures will create huge disparities that are unprecedented in 
the recent history of the United States. To cleanse the American political scene from 
anxiety, bigotry, and exclusion, we may expect more action from the judicial branch 
of power. This may sound like an emergency exit. But it is one that will save the 
future of the constitutional democracy. 
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